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Analysis of the Treasury Department Report
on Private Foundations

The committee on federal taxation of the American

Institute of Certified Public Accountants has studied the

Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations issued in
February 1965-

The Treasury is to be complimented for preparing

a comprehensive report on the activities of private foundations.

However, in our opinion, the legislation recommended as a
cure for the alleged abuses goes beyond what is required to

eliminate such abuses.

We believe that corrective changes may be desirable,
but not to the extent recommended by the Treasury.

In this

context, we respectfully submit the committee's analysis of
the Treasury's recommendations.

-2The Treasury Report, in keeping with the Congres

sional requests, is limited to private foundations but specifically
withholds judgment upon whether similar problems exist and

whether similar solutions are needed in the case of other classes
of exempt organizations.

For purposes of the Report, the

term "private foundations" designates essentially all privately
supported organizations of the type granted exemption by sec

tion 501(c)(3) except those eligible for the 30 percent limita
tion on charitable contribution deductions.
The Report finds that private foundations play a
vital role in our society.

It asserts that there is no factual

basis for the charge that foundations are becoming a dangerously
large segment of our national economy.

It finds that the founda

tions themselves are meeting the charge that they represent
dangerous concentrations of economic and social power.
Nevertheless, the Treasury asserts that there exist

six categories of major problems, as follows:

1.

Self-dealing;

2.

Delay in benefits to charity;

3.

Foundation involvement in business;

4.

Family use of foundations to control

corporate and other property;
5.

Financial transactions unrelated to
charitable functions; and

6.

Broadening of foundation management.

-31.

SELF-DEALING
Existing law prohibits self-healing except at arm's

length.

As the Treasury Report points out, this position was

adopted in conference on the Revenue Act of 1950 after the

House of Representatives had passed a bill barring certain
types of self-dealing per se and limiting others.

The Treasury

now recommends a position even more rigid than the House view
in 1950.

Virtually all self-dealing would be banned; but,

more than that, the definition of parties related to the
donor would be expanded to include corporations in which

the donor and members of his family own 20 percent or more

of the stock, as well as directors, officers, and persons
who hold 20 percent or more of the stock of a corporation which

is a substantial contributor to the foundation.
While the Treasury cites certain subtle consequences

of the existing situation, such as discrimination between tax
payers and the adverse affect upon taxpayer morale, it is quite

candid in disclosing its desire to avoid the administrative

burden of the arm's length test.

Does this mean that it will

in the future propose a ban on transactions between related
taxable corporations so that it will be free of the burden of

administering section 482?
The Treasury argues that its suggested rules simply

introduce into the tax law the concept which is fundamental to
the law of private trusts; are consistent with recent tax pro

visions applicable to pension trusts established by self-employed
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taxpayers and private foundations eligible to receive "un

limited contributions”; would deprive society as a whole of

little, if anything.
The first point to be made is that the House bill of

1950 would have Imposed an absolute ban only on loans to sub
stantial donors or to any of its officers or trustees, or any
member of their families or to a corporation controlled by

them

The House bill did not affect sales to or by the founda

tion which did not involve a substantial part of the foundation's
assets.

It imposed only an arm’s length test on services

rendered to or by the foundation.

Nevertheless, the Senate

found these provisions to be "unduly harsh in their applica

tion” and expressed the opinion that "no objection is seen to

engaging in transactions with donors if these transactions are

carried out at arm's length.”

The conferees preferred the

Senate view.

The second point to be made is that the current
Treasury proposals are consistent with the trend of tax legisla
tion since 1950 only in that they are more stringent than ever
before.

It is true that the nature of the proposed prohibited

transactions parallel those of section 503(j), dealing with
pension trusts established by self-employed taxpayers.

How

ever, section 170(g)(4), dealing with private foundations
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eligible to receive "unlimited contributions," permits some

sales to or by the foundation and both sections employ a 50

percent or more test for control -- not a 20 percent test.
Moreover, both pension plans for the self-employed and the un
limited charitable deduction tend to approach the "outer
limits" of statutory deductions where one might expect more
rigid rules than would be appropriate in circumstances of

more general application.

Insofar as the law applicable to private trusts
is concerned, we understand that so-called "self-dealing"
can occur with the permission of the beneficiaries or of the

courts.

The Treasury proposal, therefore, would be much more

inflexible than the law affecting private trusts.
It may well be that society as a whole would not

suffer from a general ban on self-dealing.

We submit that

this is speculative and that such speculation should not be

the basis for such a radical departure from tax rules of long
standing .
The Congress would be justified in Imposing a ban on
all loans by a foundation to a donor, any member of his family,

or to any of the other related parties or entities described
in section 170(g)(4).

There appears to be no necessity for

such loans nor any benefit to be derived by charity from them.

With respect to purchases from and leases to donorrelated persons, it might be appropriate to limit their scope
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along the lines of the House bill of 1950.

If the Internal

Revenue Service now finds the term "substantial" too vague
to administer, the ban might extend to transactions involving

more than 25 percent of the assets of the foundation.
In all other respects the arm's length test imposed
by section 503(c) is adequate and fair.

We are confident

that the Service has the will and the capability to enforce it.

2.

DELAY IN BENEFIT TO CHARITY

Existing law deprives a foundation of its exemption
for any year in which its accumulated income is (1) unreasonable

in amount or duration,

(2) used to a substantial degree for

non-exempt purposes, or (3) invested in such a manner as to

jeopardize the carrying out of the organization's exempt functions.
These rules also evolved in 1950, at which time the House
preferred to tax all income in excess of one year's investment

income which was not distributed currently or placed in a
special purpose 5-year trust fund.

Despite the fact that such subjective terms as

"reasonable" and "substantial" are used frequently in the In
ternal Revenue Code and in the Regulations and have been dealt

with by Revenue Agents for years, the Treasury now finds them,
in the private foundation area, to be "inadequate as well as
difficult and expensive to administer."

But the Treasury is not content merely to propose that

a non-operating foundation be required to distribute the full
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amount of its current Income by the end of the year following

the year in which it is earned (with the exception of funds ear
marked for a specific purpose).

It now advances the entirely

novel concept of a required minimum annual distribution to charity

irrespective of the foundation's actual income.

This minimum

level of charitable expenditures, described as the "income

equivalent, " would be prescribed annually by the Secretary of
the Treasury by reference to the yield on investment funds

held by such organizations as universities.

Based upon then

existing market conditions, the Report estimated that a reason
able "income equivalent" would be in the range of 3 to 3½

percent.

This rate would be applied to the fair market value

of the foundation's investment assets.

If the actual yield

was less, the organization would have to distribute corpus

to make up the difference.
It seems incongruous that the Treasury, after protesting
the difficulty and expense of administering existing law, would

make such a proposal as this.

Table 12 appearing at page 87

of the Report shows that 57 percent of foundations had ordinary

income which was less than 3 percent of market net worth, arrayed
as follows:

Donor-Related Control
20 percent or less
More than 20 percent
More than 50 percent

45%
59%
59%
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Thus, not only is the Treasury proposing an administrative task

of great magnitude for both the Service and for foundation

officials (e.g., the income equivalent would not be applied
against assets with respect to which the donor’s deduction would
be postponed by reason of other recommendations in the Report),

but we question whether significant evidence has been adduced
justifying the adoption of this radical concept.

There is no reason for objecting to a requirement
for reasonably prompt distribution of current income coupled

with the exceptions proposed by the Treasury.

We recommend the

adoption of an additional exception extending the required dis
tribution period for income set aside for a specific non-

charitable purpose such as a lawsuit or a tax proceeding, or
for establishing certain necessary reserves as provided under

generally accepted accounting principles.
It would also seem desirable to provide for deficiency

distributions to protect against the consequences of inadvertent
failure to distribute the net income within a certain time,
particularly in cases where such income is increased as the

result of a redetermination by the IRS.

The term "realized

income" should be precisely defined as being net income as

determined under Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, ex
cluding long-term capital gains, excluding the excess of

percentage depletion over cost depletion, and eliminating the
special deductions for corporations granted under sections 241

to 247 of the Code.
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Finally, for purposes of allowable deductions for
depreciation, depletion and amortization it would seem appropriate
that the basis of contributed property should be its fair market
value at the date contributed to the foundation.
3.

FOUNDATION INVOLVEMENT IN BUSINESS

The Treasury Department Report alleges that the
following serious difficulties arise from foundation commitment

to business endeavors:
a.

Regular business enterprise may suffer
serious competitive disadvantage.

b.

Opportunities for self-dealing proliferate.

c.

Foundation management may be drawn from
concern with charitable activities to time

consuming concentration on the affairs and
problems of the commercial enterprises.

Concluding that foundations have no real need to "engage in
business" and that "business participation" is altogether in
appropriate for private foundations, the Treasury proposes a

prohibition on a private foundation owning, either directly or

through stock holding, 20 percent or more of a business un
related to the charitable activities of the foundation.
The Congress dealt with these problems in 1950

when it removed the immunity formerly enjoyed by "feeder" or
ganizations and imposed a tax on the unrelated business income

of foundations.

The Treasury complains that existing law still
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permits taxable corporations unaffiliated with foundations to
be placed at a competitive disadvantage as the result of the

following:
a.

Foundations are able to lease business
assets owned free of debt to operating

subsidiaries, siphon off most or all
of the business profits by means of
rent which is deductible by the subsidiary
but not taxable to the parent foundation,
and thereby accumulate

large reservoirs

of untaxed capital which can be used to
support the future operations of the

business.

b.

Because contributions to foundations may
be deducted by the contributors for Federal

income tax purposes, the capitalization of
foundation businesses is accomplished with

tax-free dollars rather than after-tax
dollars.
c.

The tax immunity of dividends, interest,
and other proceeds stemming from passive

sources enables foundations to supply
capital to their business endeavors with
exempt income.
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d.

A remarkable number of foundation-owned
enterprises proceed from year to year
realizing substantial profits, but making

negligible or no distributions to their
parent organizations, thereby improving
their competitive posture through modern

ization and expansion.
e.

A number of foundations have revealed a
willingness to commit charitable funds to

business operations which are failing or,
at least, producing consistent losses.
Assuming, arguendo, that each of these situations exists in

undesirable proportions, we submit that they can be dealt with
adequately without "burning the house to cook the pig."

There is no abuse per se when a foundation leases
business assets to an operating subsidiary.
is excessive,

If the rent paid

the Internal Revenue Service has ample authority

under Code section 482 to correct the situation.
If abuses arise from the exemption from the unrelated

business income tax applicable to rents from leases whose term
is not longer than five years and from personal property leased

with realty, then these exemptions should be eliminated.
If it is considered undesirable to have business

capitalized with tax-free dollars, then foundations should be
prohibited from organizing, purchasing a controlling interest

in, lending money to, or contributing capital to an unrelated
business enterprise.
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If it is considered undesirable for foundation-owned
enterprises to accumulate earnings without limitation, then

Code section 532 should be amended to subject such corporate
enterprises to the accumulated earnings tax without regard

to the intent to avoid income tax.

We are not suggesting that all of the above-described

changes in our tax laws are necessary or desirable.

The

point simply is that specific problems should be met by equally
specific solutions and not by the flat prohibition on owner
ship by the private foundation of 20 percent or more of an
unrelated business.

In any event, we submit that the restriction to 20

percent ownership is too severe (anything less than 50 percent
should be sufficient ) and that its retroactivity can create
severe hardships and potential

loss of benefit to charity

as the result of forced dispositions.
We are aware of Congressman Patman's view that

foundations should be limited to ownership of no more than 3

percent of the stock of a corporation and should not be
allowed to vote such stock.

While the Treasury's proposal

is reasonable by comparison, we are not persuaded that the
Congress will enact such arbitrary legislation without the

presentation of more convincing evidence of widespread and

otherwise unpreventable abuse.

4.

-13FAMILY USE OF FOUNDATIONS TO CONTROL CORPORATE AND
OTHER PROPERTY

This question also was considered at length when
the Revenue Act of 1950 was passed.

At that time the House

bill would have denied a charitable deduction for income,

estate and gift tax purposes if both of the following condi
tions were present:

a.

The contributor, or members of his

family, had voting control of the
organization to which the gift was
made, and

b.

The contribution consisted of stock
in a corporation in which the donor,

together with members of his family
and controlled tax-exempt organizations,

controlled 50 percent or more of the
voting stock or 50 percent or more of

the total stock.
The Senate rejected this provision for the expressed

reason that greater funds would be lost to charity than were
involved in tax avoidance.

The Treasury Department Report alleges that the

following problems arise from family use of foundations to
control corporate and other property:
a.

Because of the donor’s retention of

control over the dividend distribution

policy of the corporation, the benefits

-14which charity ought to receive from

the contribution of stock are frequently
deferred indefinitely or absent altogether.
b.

By arranging redemption of token amounts
of the stock or by causing an atypical,
but strategically timed, dividend

distribution the donor may be able to
sustain his claim that the stock has

substantial value and entitles him to
a large deduction on its contribution

to the foundation.
c.

When the corporation encounters financial
difficulties, the donor's duty to the
foundation may run counter to his obliga

tion to the other shareholders or to his
own self-interest.

d.

In closely-held corporations the salary
levels of family members will be fixed
as high as is consistent with the tax

law's concept of reasonableness, whereas
the interest of the foundation lies in

keeping salaries as low as is consonant
with the employment of competent personnel.

e.

The donor may be tempted to have the

foundation retain its funds to meet the
possible future needs of the business

instead of expending them for charitable
purposes.

-15The Treasury Department admits that the so-called abuses

generated by family dominion over foundation property are

similar to those for which separate solutions were proposed in

other portions of its Report.

Nevertheless, the Treasury

proposes to deny an income tax deduction for a gift, in cases

where the donor and related parties own 20 percent or more

of the voting power of a corporation or a 20 percent or more
interest in an unincorporated business or other property,
until (a) the foundation disposes of the contributed asset,

(b) the foundation devotes the property to active charitable
operations, or (c) donor control over the business or

property terminates.

An interest owned by the foundation

would be attributed to the donor but the presumption that

a 20 percent interest constitutes control could be rebutted.
However, the Treasury suggests that the Congress

might consider an alternative solution to the alleged problems,

i.e., a postponement

of the donor's deduction only where he

and related parties exercise substantial influence over the

foundation to which the contributions are made.

The Treasury

then hedges this alternative proposal by asserting that re
tention of donor control over a corporation whose stock is

being contributed makes the real value of what has passed to

the foundation subject to the continuing volition of the
donor even where such donor exercises no substantial influence

over the foundation.

-16There may be a conflict of interest in some situa

tions where stock of a closely-held corporation is donated
to a private foundation.

But this situation generally does

not exist in a 20 percent ownership situation.

Even if a 20

percent interest constitutes effective control, there is not
necessarily any more conflict of interest between the donor

and the foundation than between the donor and the other share
holders .
We believe, as did the Senate in 1960, that the
loss to charity which will result from this approach will
exceed any tax avoidance which may be eliminated.

or

Elimination

extended deferral of income and estate tax deductions

in the instances indicated will not only remove a

factor

which encourages contributions, but will also eliminate the
ability of some individuals, such as businessmen who own
little of value outside of their business interest, to make

contributions.
Tables 10 and 11 (on pages 79 and 83) of the Report
disclose that the Treasury's proposal could affect 8 out of
every 10 foundations in existence.

Of more importance,

these tables show that the performance of foundations with
more than 20 percent donor-related influence over Investment
policy is generally just as good as that of foundations with

a lesser degree of control.
ratios.

The following are some relevant

-17-

Percent of Donor-Related Influence over Investment

Not over
20 percent
Ratio of market value of
net assets to book value

Over
Over
20 percent 50 percent

144%

141%

132%

Ratio of ordinary income to
market value of net assets

4.0

3.5

3.5

Ratio of contributions received
to market value of net assets

3.1

7.7

9.8

Ratio of grants made to market
value of net assets

6.0

6.9

7.9

Ratio of grants made to
ordinary income

151

197

222

We suggest that the Treasury has failed to make a
case for the drastic proposal which it advances.

5.

FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS UNRELATED TO CHARITABLE FUNCTIONS
The Treasury Department Report concludes that private

foundations, by engaging in three types of financial transactions
unrelated to their charitable functions, can produce seriously
unfortunate results.
a.

These types of transactions are:

Borrowing funds for purposes unrelated
to the charitable purpose;

b.

Lending funds on an unsecured basis; and

c.

Engaging in trading and speculation.
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The solution recommended would invoke an absolute ban on borrow
ing for investment purposes and on speculation, specifically

including puts, calls, short sales,
and the like.

trading in commodity futures,

Loans which the Report describes as meeting

this criterion are securities of a type regularly traded upon

an exchange or in an over-the-counter market, loans to
governmental units, loans secured by first mortgages on real
estate, loans to students, and short-term loans represented

by the marketable commercial paper of prime borrowers.

The

Secretary of the Treasury would prescribe by regulations other
loans of "substantially similar quality and character."

The evils which the Treasury perceives in borrowing

by foundations for investment purposes are:
a.

Private parties are able to shift a sub
stantial measure of the financial benefit

of the foundation's tax exemption to
themselves (the so-called "bootstrap" sale);
and

b.

The private foundation can convert its tax

exemption into a self-sufficient device
for the production of capital, thereby

severing itself from reliance upon contrib
utions and eliminating the healthful

scrutiny of its activities which is implicit
in such reliance.
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The Congress considered this matter at length

in 1950 and, more recently, in the form of H.R. 15942, a

bill which was drafted for the stated intention of dealing
with the Supreme Court's decision in Clay B. Brown.

Actually,

this bill went significantly beyond what is necessary to

deal with the "bootstrap” sale to charity.

It embraced

the entirely new concept that virtually any type of in

come derived by an exempt organization, public or private,
from the use of borrowed funds shall be taxed differently
than the same or similar income derived from the use
of corpus.

While the bill went too far, it was vastly

superior to a flat prohibition of foundation borrowing.

We believe that the corrective measures need not extend

beyond:
a.

Taxing as ordinary income the

extent to which the amount realized
from a sale to an exempt organiza

tion exceeds the fair market value
of the property sold; and

b.

Taxing as unrelated business in
come all rents derived from the
leasing of personal property with
the exception of incidental and
insubstantial personalty leased with

real property.

-20We believe that present law contains adequate

safeguards with respect to lending by foundations.

Nevertheless,

as stated previously herein, we see no objection to a pro

hibition against loans to the donor or donor-related parties.
It also seems appropriate to bar speculation.

6.

BROADENING OF FOUNDATION MANAGEMENT
The Patman Report recommended that the life of

foundations be limited to 25 years.

While not agreeing with

this conclusion, the Treasury Department Report recommends
that private foundations be required after that length of
time to convert to management which is independent of their
donors and donor-related parties.
The Treasury admits that the so-called problems in

this area "evade precise definition and quantitative analysis."
Its rationalization of this proposal seems to embrace the

concept that once a tax deduction is allowed for a contribution,
the money or property somehow

becomes transmuted into public

funds which the public has a present, or at least a latent,
right to administer.

It is lamented that many foundations

continue in existence year after year without achieving "any

of the external indica of unique advancement of philanthropy."
It has been argued -- and with considerable validity --

that an exempt organization should serve the public interest
in essentially the same fashion as when public funds are

properly expended.

Accepting this philosophy, for the sake

of argument, one must still recognize that the public interest

-21is an ephemeral concept.

We are certain that Congressman

Patman’s ideas on the proper expenditure of public funds are
poles apart from those of his colleague, Senator Tower.
Who, then, are these "persons more broadly representative

of the public" to whom the Treasury would turn over control

of every private foundation after 25 years. What, specifically
is the "parochialism" that needs to be combatted?

If there are abuses of sufficient magnitude to
vitiate the fulfillment of an organization's exempt

purpose, it would appear that adequate remedy exists under
present law through denial of exemption.

If what we are

really discussing is a difference in social predilections,

then we submit that these should not be controlled through
the medium of the tax laws.

7.

ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS

Three additional problems are discussed in the
Treasury Department Report, as follows:
a.

Contributions of unproductive property;

b.

Contributions of section 306 stock and
other ordinary income assets; and

c.

Correction of the computation of the
estate tax marital deduction.

The Treasury proposes to defer an income tax deduc

tion for a contribution of property which is unproductive of
income until the asset is (a) made productive, (b) disposed

of, or (c) applied to charitable uses.

Despite its previously

-22indicated anathema toward such terms, the Report goes on to

state that "an asset will be considered unproductive unless

substantial Income is regularly derived from it." (Emphasis
supplied. )

As in the case of the earlier discussion of the
proposed treatment of so-called controlled property, we submit

that the Treasury has failed to make a case for this drastic
proposal.
The Treasury proposes that the income tax deduction

accorded for the gift of any asset to a private foundation be

reduced by the amount of any ordinary Income which the donor
would have realized if he had sold the asset for fair market

value at the time of the contribution.
In support of this radical proposal the Treasury

appears to rely primarily on the "problem" in connection
with section 306 stock.

The only argument advanced for in

cluding other ordinary income assets is that by contributing
such assets the donor escapes taxation and at the same time
reduces the amount of his other taxable income, thereby

creating situations where the donor can make more profit
by giving the asset to a foundation than he would be able to

retain if he had sold it.

The Treasury states that the recent Congressional

action on the ordinary income situations arising under sections
1245 and 1250 is directly relevant here.

It is true that

section 170(e) provides the same rule for contributions of
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section 1245 or section 1250 property as the Treasury now

proposes for all ordinary income assets.

However, this Treasury

effort to extend the rule of sections 1245 and 1250 to

other assets ignores the purpose of these sections.

Sec

tions 1245 and 1250 deal with deductions previously taken

by the taxpayers.

They were intended to "make it feasible

for the Treasury to adopt more liberal rules with respect

to the estimated useful life of depreciable assets."

They

do so by ensuring that depreciation deductions previously
taken will ultimately be returned as ordinary income, directly

or indirectly, to the extent the deductions are not validated

by a decline in the fair market value of the respective asset.
No such considerations apply to contributions of other
property as no deductions will previously have been taken by
the taxpayer with respect to such property.

Neither is the situation with respect to stock in

collapsible corporations nearly so clear as the Report indicates.

Suppose that the corporation is not in fact collapsed and
that section 341 has ceased to be applicable before the founda
tion disposes of its stock.

Would the Treasury nevertheless

treat the charitable gift as the equivalent of a sale or exchange
for the purpose of applying section 341?

This situation is

different from "section 1245 property" which never ceases to

be such.
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Finally, it certainly seems impractical and par

ticularly unwise to further expand section 170(e) to cover
gifts of inventory items.

There is no demonstrated abuse,

and thousands of small taxpayers would be affected by such a
change.
The Treasury recommends that, where a donor secures

an income tax deduction for the transfer of an interest in
property to a foundation, the value of such property should

be excluded from the base upon which his estate tax marital
deduction is computed.

This proposal would remove the exist

ing distinction between contributions to controlled and un
controlled foundations.

It appears to be entirely appropriate.

